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A B S T R AC T  | In this article we engage with the promises and limits of the “Security and Development” 
discourse. Using Cali (Colombia) as our case study, we show how initiatives associated with this discourse, 
instead of helping States move beyond insecurity, exclusion and low levels of development by strengthening 
social relations, oicial institutions and legal frameworks, end up producing, instead, a particular set of 
precarious institutional and human arrangements. We characterise this precarity as moving in the realm 
of “pettiness:” a characterisation that for us suggests both the marginal kinds of solutions that ultimately 
form the core of Security and Development, and the limsiness that has come to mark those institutional 
and human arrangements resulting from it. The result is a resilient liminality across the board and the 
continuation of insecurity.
K E Y W O R D S  | Thesaurus: crime; State. Author: citizenship security; insecurity; petty crime; security and 
development
¿Seguridad y desarrollo? Una historia sobre los pequeños crímenes, el pequeño Estado y sus pequeñas leyes
R E S U M E N  | En este artículo discutimos las promesas y los límites del discurso de “Seguridad y Desarrollo”. 
Usando Cali (Colombia) como nuestro estudio de caso, mostramos cómo las iniciativas asociadas con este 
discurso terminan produciendo un conjunto de arreglos institucionales y humanos precarios, en vez de ayudar 
a los Estados a superar la inseguridad, la exclusión y los bajos niveles de desarrollo. En este artículo caracteri-
zamos esta precariedad en términos de “pequeñez”: una caracterización que para nosotros sugiere la limitación 
de los tipos marginales de soluciones que en última instancia forman el núcleo de la Seguridad y el Desarrollo, 
así como de la fragilidad que han marcado los arreglos institucionales y humanos que él mismo construye. El 
resultado inal es una permanente liminalidad del Estado y una continuación de la inseguridad.
PA L A B R A S  C L AV E  | Thesaurus: crimen; Estado. Autor: delito menor; inseguridad; seguridad ciudadana; 
seguridad y desarrollo
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Segurança e desenvolvimento? Uma história sobre os pequenos crimes, o pequeno Estado e suas pequenas leis
R E S U M O  | Neste artigo, discutimos as promessas e os limites do discurso de “Segurança e Desenvolvimento”. 
Usando a cidade de Cali (Colômbia) como nosso estudo de caso, mostramos como as iniciativas associadas a esse 
discurso acabam produzindo um conjunto de acordos institucionais e humanos precários, em vez de ajudar os 
Estados a superarem a insegurança, a exclusão e os baixos níveis de desenvolvimento. Neste artigo, caracter-
izamos essa precariedade em termos de “pequenez”: uma caracterização que, para nós, sugere a limitação dos 
tipos marginais de soluções que, em última instância, formam o núcleo da Segurança e do Desenvolvimento, 
assim como da fragilidade que vem marcando os acordos institucionais e humanos que ele constrói. O resultado 
inal é uma permanente limitação do Estado e uma continuidade da insegurança.
PA L AV R A S - C H AV E  | Thesaurus: crime; Estado; insegurança. Autor: delito menor; segurança cidadã; segurança 
e desenvolvimento
Ours, after all, is an epoch —if not the irst, then certainly the latest—  
in which law-making, law-breaking and law-enforcement  
are especially critical registers in which societies construct,  
contest, and confront truths about themselves.
(Comarof and Comarof 2016, xiii)
Introduction
In this article, we explore the dramas underpinning and 
unleashed by the current encounter between “securi-
ty” and “development” in the Global South. This is an 
encounter that has come to be conceptualised under 
the rubric of “Security and Development”: a powerful 
and rapidly expanding set of discourses and practices 
which, borrowing from decades of interpenetration 
between security concerns and the international devel-
opment project during the Cold War years and later 
during the international humanitarian interventions in 
the 1990s, has come to occupy a crucial place in poli-
cy-making debates in our era of seemingly never-end-
ing war on terror. As former World Bank president 
Robert Zoellick (2007–2012) put it in his foreword to the 
2011 World Development Report: Conlict, Security and 
Development, the aim is to bring “security and develop-
ment together to put down roots deep enough to break 
the cycles of fragility and conlict” in countries such as 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti, Southern Sudan, and many 
“other lands of conlict or broken States” (Zoellick 2011). 
According to Zoellick, “recurrent cycles of weak gov-
ernance, poverty, and violence” have “plagued these 
lands.” Security and Development discussions and poli-
cies have aimed, in this context, to replace “fragility and 
conlict” with stronger State institutions, lasting social 
inclusion and long-term economic outcomes —in Zoel-
lick’s words, “to move beyond conlict and fragility and 
secure development.”2
2 On the merging of “security” and “development,” see Duield 
(2014).
In this article we engage with the tensions that have 
accompanied this project and show how, instead of 
“moving beyond” insecurity, exclusion and low devel-
opment levels by strengthening social relations, oicial 
institutions and legal frameworks, discussions and 
associated technologies of Security and Development 
produce a particular set of precarious institutional and 
human arrangements. We characterise this precarity 
as moving in the realm of “pettiness” —in the sense of 
“triviality” and “smallness,” rather than of “pickiness” or 
“nastiness.” Pettiness suggests both the marginal kinds 
of solutions that ultimately form the core of Security 
and Development, and the smallness or limsiness that 
has come to mark the institutional and human arrange-
ments resulting from it. Pettiness, in other words, sig-
nals the manner in which Security and Development 
has ended up supporting second-class ixes which pro-
duce second-class subjects and second-class visions of 
the State and law. What it does not support are struc-
tural solutions to global problems related to human and 
institutional instability, as expressed, for example, in 
urban violence. We are deeply concerned about these 
“petty” arrangements because they are deployed in 
contexts that have already sufered countless waves of 
failed developmental interventions (places that have 
been systematically “underdeveloped” to use the lan-
guage of Andre Gunter Frank (1966) and Walter Rodney 
(1972)), and because they are expanding, as a result, a 
world already organised around the late liberal man-
agement of vulnerability. As Povinelli has argued, today 
vulnerability is not seen as something that necessarily 
needs to be solved but rather as something to be admin-
istered. In this context, social relations are paciied via 
exercises of inclusion without proper entitlements, and 
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social life is securitized without actual security. In this 
process a particular world is being made, one marked 
by orchestrated forms of abandonment (Povinelli 2011).
This situation is neatly illustrated by the large amount 
of attention currently being paid to “petty crime” and 
“petty criminals” as part of the arrival of the Security 
and Development agenda in cities in the Global South 
—the inal frontier when it comes to breaking “the 
cycles of fragility and conlict” mentioned by Zoellick. 
To fully grasp the implications of this phenomenon and 
its products —what we call here “petty subjects,” “petty 
States” and “petty laws”— we need to engage, however, 
with the ground-level motions of Security and Devel-
opment. To achieve this, we will take the reader on an 
ethnographic visit to Cali, a city of around 2.5 million 
people in south-eastern Colombia. In Cali, as in many 
other cities in the Global South today, what Jean and 
John Comarof would call “law-making, law-breaking 
and law-enforcement” have become critical registers 
for witnessing the kind of world resulting from the 
current international obsession with “security” and 
“development” (Comarof & Comarof 2016, xii).3
In order to organise our analysis, the following sections 
introduce Cali and our main problem in more detail, and 
we then describe how cities and their residents have 
become key spaces within the Security and Develop-
ment discourse. After that, we examine one of the many 
programs that are currently targeting petty criminals 
and vulnerable youth in Cali. This program shares three 
basic characteristics with many similar exercises tak-
ing place in the city and other locales across the Global 
South: i) it is based on the idea of inclusion through what 
we deine as “neo-developmental punitive technologies,” 
which combine conditional services and psychosocial 
strategies to bring young people involved or at risk of 
getting involved in crime into the city’s oicial life; ii) it 
uses public-private associations and normative frame-
works to join and strengthen forces in the ight against 
crime; and iii), its solutions, which operate in a neoliberal 
context of ongoing budgetary restrictions and late cap-
italist aspirations, are skewed towards individual “heal-
ing,” rather than collective or structural causal factors. 
Thanks to these characteristics, programmes like the 
one we examine below give rise to an expansive scenar-
io of intervention, a scenario that saturates the lives of 
their young “clients” —and their “providers”— with the 
presence of the State and its laws. But as we will see, the 
State that transpires and is constituted through these 
programmes is an entity which, regardless of good will 
or ideas, is always limited, always “petty.” So what we 
have is a State, and of course a set of laws, that is never 
3 Our approach in this article builds on a rich, diverse body 
of literature on the anthropology of the State, law and the 
global order, now intersecting with the question of security. 
See for example, as overviews of this literature: Goldstein 
(2010); Pottage and Mundy (2004); Sharma and Gupta (2006).
suiciently robust to solve the problems at hand, yet 
that always seems to be present. Security and Develop-
ment interventions then reproduce arrangements that, 
despite being second-class in nature, still carry enor-
mous weight in terms of forming a particular kind of 
social order. Petty criminals and the (petty) State and 
its (petty) law mutually create and recreate themselves 
without ever deinitively eradicating their liminality or 
the insecurities that unite them —a point that we expand 
on in the last section.
Our analysis here does not lead us to suggest that greater 
“robustness,” for example, or a new, untested structural 
approach of some kind, might one day make the Security 
and Development discourse “efective.” These options 
are often unavailable in the current environment. Worse 
still, they risk further escalating the violence that already 
underpins the State and the world that emerges with 
and through it.4 As a result we invite the reader to appre-
ciate, instead, the profound constrains that characterise 
life in the expanded South today. These constraints, and 
the agonies unleashed by them, are precisely the predic-
ament of today’s peripheries; they are realities that force 
us to ask how “insecurity” and “underdevelopment” are 
produced in the irst place.
Our city, our problem
Like many other rapidly globalising cities in the Global 
South, and despite huge advances in recent years, Cali 
remains one of the most crime-ridden cities both in 
Colombia and in the world. According to a recent report 
by the Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal 
Justice (2017), Cali is the world’s 21st most violent city in 
terms of homicides per capita —even if it moved from 
80 homicides per 100,000 people in 2012 to 51 in 2017.5 
Youth gangs, high numbers of teenage deaths, and the 
proliferation of so-called oicinas (neighborhood-based 
criminal organizations) are still the common elements 
of the image Cali presents to Colombia and to the world. 
Diferent, positive visions of the city have also come to 
deine Cali, however. Stories of inancial success, the 
eradication of organized crime and extreme violence 
linked to drug traicking, an ethnic multiplicity, a 
dynamic public administration, a philanthropic ethos 
rooted in local companies, a large young population and 
a broad range of artistic events6 today counterbalance 
Cali’s stories of violence and disorder.
4 See especially on the limited character of policies associat-
ed to “Security and Development,” Chandler (2007; 2015).
5 The Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Jus-
tice (Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia 
Penal - CCSP JP) is a non-governmental organisation estab-
lished in Mexico in 2002 and dedicated to the monitoring 
of conlict globally.
6 These include the World Salsa Festival, the Petronio Álvarez 
Music Festival, and Ajazzgo, among many others.
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The result of this combination of positive and negative 
elements is a city looded with energy, aspirations and 
intense contradictions: three elements that character-
ise its young people and that place them at the center 
of public attention. Cali’s young people are its present 
and future, but they also engender the problems that 
the city has not been able to overcome. This situation 
is comparable to that of many other Latin American cities 
and beyond, where young people involved in or at risk 
of engaging in criminal activities have become the pro-
tagonists of an urban drama associated with insecurity.7 
It is a drama that speaks of the efects of late capitalist 
modernity in the Global South, particularly in countries 
like Colombia which, despite declaring themselves at 
“peace” or “post-conlict,” always seem stuck in a cycle 
of economic volatility, unemployment and social and 
political unrest.
Young people in Cali, and their relationship to this dra-
ma of insecurity, are also marked, again as in many oth-
er places, by a strong racial element. Cali is two hours 
away from the impoverished Paciic Coast of Colom-
bia, which has encouraged mass migration —mainly 
of people of African descent— away from this area to 
the city. Some 26,5% of Cali’s urban population iden-
tify as black, and of all Colombian cities it is home to 
the greatest proportion of Afro-Colombians. Tellingly, 
some 25% of this population is subject to the efects of 
extreme spatial and economic exclusion (Rodríguez, 
Alfonso and Cavelier 2009). The same happens with 
unemployment, where the highest levels tend to occur 
in the Afro-Colombian population and their territories 
(Uribe-Castro, Holguín and Ayala 2016). This is especial-
ly evident in Aguablanca —a large area in the city’s east 
that emerged in the 1970s due to internal displacement 
caused by Colombia’s armed conlict (Urrea 1997). Oi-
cially encompassing what are called, according to the 
city’s administrative distribution, Comunas 13, 14, 15 
and 21, Aguablanca is home to the largest proportion of 
displaced Afro-Colombians in the country. Half of Cali’s 
homicides are committed in this area, most involving 
males aged between 14 and 21 (Cali cómo vamos 2015).
As mentioned, however, Cali is no longer perceived as a 
place of great crime. The city used to be the headquar-
ters of one of the big drug cartels operating during the 
1980s and 1990s, which is when it was catapulted into 
the global imaginary, together with Medellin, as one of 
the main poles of the Colombian maia —an image that 
continues to be lucratively recycled in TV series such 
as Netlix’s Narcos (2015–ongoing). Today’s Cali is seen 
diferently. As Colombia’s post-conlict status sets in, 
Cali is perceived as being on the path to “development,” 
7 There are many studies on the association between secu-
rity and youth violence in Latin America. See in the case 
of Argentina, Medan (2012; 2014) and Raggio and Sabarots 
(2012) and in the case of Brazil, Gough and Franch (2006) and 
Ursin (2012).
if it could only solve the problems of its low-grade yet 
endemic, racialized, and diicult-to-control insecurity. 
According to this narrative, it is now a city afected 
by what has long been known in criminological cir-
cles as “petty crime,” including mobile-phone theft, 
micro-traicking of illegal drugs, micro-extortion, and 
occasional murders (Figure 1).8
Figure 1. Mobile-phone thief captured by local police in Cali
Source: HSBNoticias.com, 24 September, 2015.
In this context, Cali has become a privileged place in 
which to test the new range of discourses and devel-
opmental practices associated with security, which we 
began to describe in the introduction. Known by the 
general label of Security and Development, these new 
practices and discourses are part of a recently formed 
“know-how” and a new chapter of global governance 
which aims to achieve public security, or what is also 
known as “citizenship security.”9 Interestingly in Cali, 
as we will see, the decision of the city’s administrative 
8 According to the Observatory of Childhood Welfare, part 
of the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF 2012), 
the percentage of youths entered into the penal system has 
increased by an annual rate of about 10% since 2010. Various 
laws and public policies have been issued in response to this 
situation, including CONPES Document 173 (2014) and Law 
1622 (2013). These laws deine “youth” as everyone between 
14 and 28 years old.
9 According to the National Policy on Coexistence and Citizen 
Security, in Spanish, Política Nacional de Seguridad Ciudad-
ana y Convivencia, “citizen security” is understood as “the 
universal protection of citizens from crimes and contra-
ventions that afect their dignity, their personal safety and 
that of their goods, and in terms of their fear of insecurity. 
Cohabitation involves the promotion of the citizens’ attach-
ment and adhesion to a citizen culture based on a respect 
for the law, for others, and for basic norms of behaviour and 
social coexistence” (DNP 2011, 1).
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organs to embrace the Security and Development agenda 
has not been accompanied by the expansion of the typi-
cal “irm hand” associated with law-and-order responses 
to crime.10 While still present, as evidenced by the large 
proportion of the city’s resources dedicated to the sala-
ries of police units and the improvement of police infra-
structure, such an approach has come be seen as not only 
too costly both politically and inancially but also as not 
suicient to tackle the problem of insecurity.11 So what 
has emerged in recent years is a range of new policing 
and surveillance technologies and, perhaps more impor-
tantly for us here, a broad array of new developmental 
practices: practices that aim to create a more robust 
State presence in the city via more responsive, econom-
ically eicient and lexible policies and norms. These 
new policies and norms have become the platform for 
implementing social intervention measures which aim 
to “include” the city’s youth —involved or at risk of being 
involved in crime— in the city’s oicial dynamics. Trying 
to use the always insuicient public resources to their 
maximum extent, these more afordable developmental 
practices strive to generate security and development 
by including the city’s peripheral subjects in its oicial 
life, generating that sense of safety which international 
institutions, local and foreign investors, and residents 
—both rich and poor—are demanding of the local admin-
istration (Figure 2).12
These new Security and Development practices rely on 
what we call “neo-developmental punitive technolo-
gies,” which often combine “conditional services” with 
psychosocial attention ofered to vulnerable young 
people as a tool of crime dissuasion and social inclu-
sion. The conditional services materialize in the form 
of employment, sport, education and more general care 
services delivered by public and private institutions and 
community police oicers on condition of behavioural 
change on the part of their young recipients. They rep-
resent a brave attempt to return to pre-neoliberal times 
in which welfare, in particular full employment, or the 
aspiration to generate it, constituted the organisational 
10 Cali’s security expenditure has fallen from 60% to 20% of 
its local budget in 20 years. One of our informants explained 
this change in the following way: “In the 90s everything 
was spent on tomba [slang for police]” (Interview with public 
servant, Town Hall, 09/03/2018).
11 In December 2017, Cali had 6500 police oicers. With an 
annual budget close to 3 billon COP (1,000 million USD), the 
city invests in its police force 21,000 million COP (7.3 million 
USD). Although much smaller in terms of investment, the 
youth support programs that we analyse here have started 
to received signiicant resources. In 2017, these programmes 
received 5,000 million pesos (more than 1.7 million USD) —
an amount that was reduce by 30% in 2018 (Interview with 
public servant, Town Hall, 09/03/2018).
12 On the clamour for “security” by both the rich and the poor, 
and the connection of this phenomenon to the broader neo-
liberal turn in the South and the emergence of a “right to 
security,” see especially: Goldstein (2011). See also on the 
securitization of social relations: Neocleous (2014).
force behind State action and the construction of cit-
izenship (Esping-Andersen 1999). However, these 
beneits and employment options are now not only 
“conditional” but also very limited. This is due to the 
national and local governments’ inancial constraints 
and, more generally, the larger restrictions —derived 
from our inequality-producing global order— imposed 
on any initiative of meaningful social inclusion.13
Figure 2. Cali’s mayor, Maurice Armitage, congratulating a 
young man who benefited from the Youth without Borders 
program (Jóvenes sin Fronteras) (discussed in Section III)
Source: Photo from the official brochure of the program 
(2016).
In this context, the use of “psychosocial” discourses, 
ideas and interventions have massively proliferat-
ed through these programmes. Departing from an 
understanding that individuals need to be considered 
products as much as makers of their societies, the psy-
chosocial is brought into these programmes to help 
young people overcome what is seen as their lack of 
sociability and self-esteem, and to assimilate the com-
munity values required by (formal and legal) city life.14 
Delivered on occasions by professionals, but more 
generally just employed as the underpinning rationale 
of these programmes, this approach has come to be 
considered, therefore, not only as a more eicient ave-
nue to reach out to young people but also as the best 
avenue to help them rebuild their lives based on their 
“individual” psychological circumstances and family 
13 The literature on the diiculties of enacting alternative 
development models and putting into practice meaningful 
social inclusion programmes is vast. Three pieces that out-
line the contours of this problem and its efects both in the 
North and South, particularly in terms of global structural 
limits to the peripheries of the world, jobless growth pat-
terns and long patterns of material inequality, are Fischer 
(2015), Murray Li (2013) and Johnson (2015).
14 See on the assumptions and objectives of psychosocial 
approaches: Frosh (2003).
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backgrounds. In the precarious context that charac-
terises Cali, and in the larger neoliberal environment 
in which the city exists, however, this psychosocial 
approach often ends up occupying a large proportion of 
these neo-developmental punitive technologies, thus 
emphasising emotional and individual-based solutions 
more than structural changes. In doing so they have 
come to replicate, in Cali, issues that have already been 
identiied by larger critiques of this “psychosocial turn” 
in social policy towards individualization, subjectiica-
tion, psychologisation and the therapeutic.15 According 
to Stenner and Taylor, for example, this new excessive 
focus on the individual has come to confuse “what 
might be distinctive about the psychic and the social,” 
creating an inability “to address the issues of redis-
tribution, equality and inequality, justice and injustice 
that pertain to societal level structures and processes” 
(Stenner and Taylor 2008).
Against this backdrop, active petty criminals or those at 
risk of falling into a life of crime in Cali are actually being 
produced in particular ways through these neo-devel-
opmental punitive technologies. At the same time, the 
State, in responding to its petty criminals —in its obses-
sion with controlling and helping them, with all of its 
ambitions and limitations, through these new methods— 
is reconstructing itself to suit this period of late capitalist 
modernity.16 These technologies respond to and create 
subjects, a State and laws marked then by what we have 
described as “marginality,” “smallness,” and being “sec-
ond-class.” For us, this “pettiness” demonstrates how, in 
precarious contexts of developmental experimentation 
and in the face of economic imperatives, what ends up 
being perpetually reproduced are disciplined evanes-
cent bodies: bodies in which battles around security 
and development —which are in reality battles around 
small crimes committed by vulnerable, out of school, 
unemployed and impoverished young people— generate 
transitional forms of existence. These forms of exis-
tence oscillate constantly between macro-visibility and 
absence, occasional satisfaction of needs and hunger, 
periods of relative peace and violence. This liminality, 
or this particular form of “abandonment,” to keep using 
the conceptual repertoire we have begun to build here, 
speaks again of a sociality where the lack of structural 
solutions is repeatedly superseded by sporadic beneits 
and, most of all, expanding discourses of afection that 
do not necessarily have material traction in terms of 
satisfying pressing needs. All this feeds a reality already 
full of drama, a reality in which young people are the 
object of public policies yet continue to declare, through 
15 These critiques of individualization and subjectiication go 
back to Foucault via Rose (1989) and Beck (1992). See on the 
turn to individualization, subjectiication and behavioural 
base solutions and approaches: Parker (2007), Madsen (2014). 
See especially in the development context: Klein (2017).
16 See for example on the State as a social relation, Jessop 
(2016).
an Adidas trademark shaved on their heads, for example, 
that only the market efectively includes them (Figure 3); 
in which civil servants and community actors dedicate 
their lives to creating State institutions but struggle to 
the point of weeping when they relect on the State’s 
perennial insuiciency (Figure 4); and, more generally, in 
which a middle class, responding to the popular image 
of Cali as an unsafe city, screams out for a strong State 
while putting into operation new and more sophisticat-
ed schemes of private security that increasingly conine 
them to gated communities (Figure 5).17
Figure 3. Chico Caleño (a young person from Cali) with Adi-
das trademark shaved in his hair
Source: Courtesy of a community leader.
Figure 4. Delivery of staple goods, part of a program of early 
intervention to prevent petty crime in Cali
Source: Courtesy of a community leader.
17 See: Focas and Rincón (2016).
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Figure 5. Private security in action in Cali
Source: Photo by the authors.
A global agenda
Before we get further into the intricacies of petty crime 
and its management in Cali, we want to lesh out in 
more detail the centrality of cities in the Security and 
Development agenda. The starting point of this side of 
our story concerns the State-building eforts that con-
sistently lie behind attempts to solve the historically 
assumed precariousness of the postcolonial South. This 
was initially characterized by the establishment of cen-
tralized States, and local elites’ drive to control, as much 
as possible, internal markets and the processes of inter-
nal industrialization. This centralism was a clear expres-
sion of the developmental energies that accompanied 
State formation in the South, beginning with the wars 
of independence in the irst half of the 19th century in 
Latin America, and during the decolonization period 
from the end of the Second World War to the mid-1970s 
in Africa, Asia and the Paciic (Eslava 2019). With the 
advent of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, howev-
er, the idea of decentralizing Southern States emerged 
as a new rationale to think about State-building and 
development. Cities then began to be positioned as the 
new centers of action, control and management.
The call to decentralize States —which became known 
as “fragile States” during this time— unleashed a 
re-reading of cities as the new centers of capital accu-
mulation and as nodes of more lexible and dynamic 
governance strategies; in other words, places more 
able to generate exchanges between the local and the 
global. Cities, in this process of “petty-ing” the State, 
surfaced in international and national policies and laws 
as the ideal jurisdictions in which to make not only the 
domestic but also the global order more present, inti-
mate, close, intelligent, economically proicient and 
safe (Eslava 2015).
Cali, again, is a revealing location from which to appre-
ciate the operation and limits of this reallocation of 
the developmental project, in particular the security 
project, from national institutions to local municipal-
ities.18 In Cali the arrival of decentralization has been 
framed by the city’s many achievements but also by its 
unequal economic growth and a population drastically 
fragmented in terms of race, employment options, loca-
tion in the city, and enjoyment of urban infrastructure. 
In this context small crime has emerged as a form of 
life, in particular for the city’s marginalized youth, and 
thus as a key local developmental concern. For the local 
administration, young people involved in this type of 
activity are, however, slippery subjects trapped by pov-
erty, colour, dialect, chronic unemployment, early deser-
tion from school, teenage pregnancy, addictions and, 
more often than not, criminal records linked to minor 
crimes from a very early age (Cisalva 2017). To regu-
late and help them, however, the city —a city trapped 
in a neoliberal world, as we have suggested— only has 
limited resources or, perhaps more precisely, the local 
government is only politically able to mobilize a small 
fraction of the city’s budget for these matters. The 
result is that the local administration cannot do much 
to substantially solve the problems of petty crime yet, 
due to the strong call to Security and Development, 
cannot ignore the problem either. What has come out 
of all of this, therefore, is that the city’s government 
inds itself experimenting with inancially-constrained, 
budget-compliant programmes that try to negotiate the 
complex realities of the young people involved in petty 
crime: subjects who continually slip through the net 
of services ofered by the public administration, which 
continues to insist on reaching and controlling them.19
This reality relects more extensive processes related 
to international eforts to ensure security in a Global 
South generally characterized by great socio-spatial and 
economic segregation, fragile economies, and a middle 
class panicked by the possibility that their goods —their 
only stronghold— may be stolen, or that in a moment of 
confusion, during a theft, they may be injured or killed 
(see Santillán and Varea 2014; Winton 2005). Concerns 
18 On the shift of the security agenda from the national to the 
urban level, see: Pontes Nogueira (2017).
19 On experimentalism and the New Developmental State, 
particularly in the case of Latin America, see: Alviar (2013); 
Trubek (2013).
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for urban crime and safety have become, for these rea-
sons, a powerful argument for advancing new models 
of governance that combine “hard” and increasingly 
“softer” —in the sense of afordable and thus experi-
mental— forms of social control in Global South cities. 
As always, development, this time at the local level, jus-
tiies making security concerns, and the application of 
these new policy prescriptions, a pressing matter.
Evidence of this new face of global governance based 
on the connection between (in)security and develop-
ment and on the importance of acting creatively from 
a local sphere is enormous. For example, at the interna-
tional level, in 2011 the World Bank published its report 
Violence in the City: Understanding and Supporting Com-
munity responses to Urban Violence, which argues that 
urban violence must be urgently tackled by combining 
public and community crime prevention strategies 
with development programs.20 This concern and a need 
for local developmental actions have been relected, in 
the case of Colombia, in a transformation of the entire 
national criminal law apparatus over the past decade, 
aiming to expedite criminal processes and make them 
more responsive to local conditions, and in an extraor-
dinary reallocation of budgetary resources towards 
local security concerns (CEJ and British Embassy 2011). 
In 2013, for example, “citizenship security” became the 
main focus of national expending for the irst time in 
the country’s history (Urna de Cristal 2013). This bud-
getary commitment relected, in turn, an even broader 
shift in the reading of “security” within the country. In 
2011, the High Presidential Advisory Oice for Coexis-
tence and Citizen Security marked this shift by issuing 
the National Policy on Coexistence and Citizen Security, 
with the objective of achieving peace in urban contexts 
(Alta Consejería Presidencial para la Convivencia y 
Seguridad Ciudadana 2011).
The turn towards the city as the site for achieving 
“citizenship security” in Colombia and elsewhere has 
been accompanied by an important additional transfor-
mation. The “citizenry”, rather than the “nation”, has 
become the center of governmental protection. How-
ever, this “citizenry”, or “society” in Foucault’s sense, is 
far from being an abstract entity. It is imagined instead 
as a collective of, above all, property holders, ready to 
contribute to the development of their cities, nations 
and the world, but paralyzed by the dangers on their 
streets. This reading of the citizenry is mixed, of course, 
with middle-class images and imaginaries of why cities 
are violent, who is violent, and how to solve the urban 
drama of insecurity (Santillán and Varea 2014). To sort 
this situation out and, in particular, to respond to the 
20 A key document preceding this report is Youth Violence in 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Costs, Causes, and Inter-
ventions, published in 1999 by the World Bank (Moser and 
van Bronkhorst 1999). See also: Chioda (2017); World Bank 
(2005; 2014).
concerns experienced by this urban citizenry, new 
security policies are unveiled, combining punitive prac-
tices with social intervention programs that aspire to 
promote security and achieve the development that 
has been always so elusive in the South (Medan 2014; 
Raggio and Sabarots 2012).
Cali, as one of the most important and complicated cit-
ies in terms of urban violence, has been at the center of 
the Security and Development initiatives promoted by 
the World Bank and other international organizations 
and the Colombian government (OEA 2009; CCSP JP 
2017; World Bank 2011). In June 2013, for example, Cali’s 
local government hosted a high-level regional meet-
ing, coordinated by the World Bank, in which mayors 
from all over Latin America shared their experiences of 
programs implemented to counteract the growing phe-
nomena of urban insecurity. The World Bank reported 
the results of the meeting in the following way:
Twenty years ago, Cali was on the frontline of one 
of the world’s most dangerous wars. A group of drug 
traickers […] clashed violently with their enemies in 
Medellin [...] This week, Cali received some 450 guests 
from around the continent, who came to discuss the 
problem of crime and violence that devastated 
this city and that now afects the entire region, from 
the suburbs of Chicago to the highways of Central 
America […] For everyone at the conference, it was 
clear that citizen insecurity is a multifaceted issue 
that cannot be addressed solely by public security 
forces. In others words, a “irm hand” is not enough 
to resolve the problem. (World Bank 2013, n.p)
As we can see, the meeting concluded by conirm-
ing that traditional “irm-hand” approaches to crime 
should be complimented with smarter strategies, more 
adapted to local needs and resources. This shift away 
from “irmness” in the approach to crime and the pro-
motion of safety speaks of the way in which broader 
international discourses around law —in particular “the 
rule of law”— and its application have been modulated 
by developmental imperatives and their more mallea-
ble approach to social administration, a phenomenon 
expressed by the recent inclusion of “justice” as a mea-
surable target in the UN’s Sustainable Development 
Goals (United Nations 2015).21
The possibility of these new security approaches suc-
ceeding, however, is very small. One reason for this is 
the macro-economic igures of countries such as Colom-
bia and their cities, including Cali. In terms of poverty, 
unemployment and inequality, the numbers are not 
encouraging. The Cali Chamber of Commerce reports, 
for example, that the city’s socio-economic igures 
21 On the rule of law and development, see: Kennedy (2006); 
Trubek (2006).
48
rev.estud.soc. No. 67 • enero-marzo • Pp. 40-55 • ISSN 0123-885X • e-ISSN 1900-5180 · https://doi.org/10.7440/res67.2019.04
D O S S I E R
improved rapidly at the beginning of the 2000s but that 
between 2010 and 2016 inequality and unemployment 
increased by almost 20% (CCC 2017). Meanwhile Cali 
continues to be, as mentioned in the introduction, one 
of the world’s most unsafe cities according to homicides 
per capita —a igure The Economist recently turned into 
world news (“The World´s Most” 2017). Poverty, unem-
ployment, inequality and insecurity go hand in hand. 
Faced with this reality, however, the local administra-
tion has been strengthening its commitments to citizen 
security and experimenting with newer policies.
Closely following the World Bank’s suggestion for 
more lexible approaches, the new policies Cali has 
been implementing are organised not around law’s 
usual rigidity, but through lexible, cost-efective exer-
cises of integration. This social approach as a security 
strategy has had concrete efects on the construction 
of State-society relations. As we shall see in the next 
section, it has implied a counter-intuitive political eco-
nomic rationale: doing more while spending less. As 
such, the State is currently presented as an entity able 
to do more than it has always done, but with fewer 
resources. This contradiction can only be resolved by 
leaving a large part of its operation in the hands of third 
parties, or of the very communities and individuals its 
plans are designed to beneit.
This devolution is done through a complex system of 
incentives and externalization mechanisms that take the 
form, for example, of social philanthropy, co-responsi-
bility frameworks and, as we have suggested, individual 
training.22 The net efect is a State deeply involved in 
the life of the city, particularly in those sections that are 
vulnerable. This involvement is efectuated, however, by 
local civil servants or lay community actors, who serve 
as bridges to services or who are directly engaged in pro-
viding emotional care. But regardless of their important 
work, the services these actors can ofer to their “clients” 
are generally unable able to solve the root causes of the 
problems faced. For the young people at the center of 
these programs, the State therefore ends up being always 
there, in their lives, neighbourhoods and houses, but 
with a presence always marked by a spirit of experimen-
tation, and most importantly, by inancial constraints. 
Frustrations, half-built “life projects” and entrenchment 
in deiant ways of life are these young people’s response 
to a State that promises more with less.
A neo-developmental punitive program
The Jóvenes sin Fronteras (“Youth without Borders”) 
programme illustrates the repertoire of eforts that are 
22 For an analysis of public-private co-responsibility in secu-
rity programs, and the link between development and 
psychological/psychosocial exercises, see: Akhtar (2015); 
Haapasalo (2000); Siennick (2011); Tufró (2010).
being put into operation in Cali to include young people 
“at risk” of entering, or already involved in, petty crim-
inal networks and integrate them into the city’s oicial 
life.23 As we show in this section, this programme man-
ifests the kind of expansionism, saturation and inal 
lack of robustness that we argue has accompanied the 
co-constitution of “petty criminals,” a “petty State” and 
“petty laws” in Cali in recent years under the banner of 
Security and Development.
Jóvenes sin Fronteras was one of the initiatives brought 
by Mayor Maurice Armitage into the city during 
his tenure (2016–2019). A well-known industrialist 
from the region, with a long history of philanthropic 
involvement in social projects, and a newcomer to oi-
cial politics in his senior years, Armitage made a broad 
commitment to “human development” in his Govern-
ment Plan, which he understood in terms of increasing 
local productivity and ameliorating unemployment, 
inequality, poverty and (key for our discussion here) 
insecurity (Armitage 2016).24 In Armitage’s words, one 
of his main priorities as mayor was to break what he 
identiied as the “vicious circle of poverty, violence and 
insecurity” existing in the city (Armitage 2016, 4). In 
order to tackle the problem of crime, in particular crim-
inal activities involving youth, Armitage proposed an 
approach heavily grounded in combining the modern-
ization of the local police force with the social, econom-
ic and afective inclusion of this young population with 
the help of community and private actors. He described 
this approach to security as “Proposals for a Safe, Pacif-
ic and Reconciled Cali” (Armitage 2016, 23–26).
Following the broad turn towards Security and Devel-
opment, Armitage generated a series of programmes 
during his three years in government combining classic 
concerns linked to employment, recreation, education 
and care with conditional and pedagogical exercises 
geared towards generating what came to be called the 
“socio-productive reintegration” of petty criminals 
(Armitage 2016, 24). The objective was, in the language 
of Armitage’s Government Plan:
To halt the cycle of criminal renewal in the city 
whereby the gang leadership is replenished by climb-
ing younger members, by ofering these aspiring 
leaders waiting in the queue opportunities to rebuild 
their life projects based on the generation of formal 
income and the unlearning [desaprendizaje] of vio-
lence, their emotional healing [sanación emocional], 
23 We reviewed seven programs in depth and chose to focus 
on Jóvenes sin Fronteras because it shows, with particular 
sharpness, some of the key features of “security and devel-
opment” initiatives in regards to youth. The abundance of 
these programs can be seen as a further evidence in support 
of our argument.
24 Armitage’s Government Plan became Cali’s Local Develop-
ment Plan (Cali progresa contigo – Acuerdo 0396/2016).
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and the restoration of their family, neighbourhood and 
community connections. (Armitage 2016, 24)
Working within these parameters, the local adminis-
tration created the Jóvenes sin Fronteras programme 
—a name that makes reference to the “borders” (fron-
teras) set up by criminal gangs within neighbourhoods 
to mark their territories. Administered by Cisalva, a 
multiple-award-winning research center dedicated 
to the study of urban crime and violence that belongs to 
Universidad del Valle (the most important university 
in the city), and run in partnership with the Integrated 
Management of Gangs Scheme which operates under 
the Preventative Policing Unit of Cali’s Metropolitan 
Police Department (Policía Metropolitana de Cali 2016), 
this programme works through “educadores” (docents) 
and “enlaces” (links) living in neighbourhoods iden-
tiied on the basis of their criminal proile. Through 
these educadores, who are often professional social 
workers, and enlaces, former members of gangs from 
these areas, the local administration’s objective is to get 
into contact with vulnerable young people in order to 
provide conditional opportunities in education, sport 
and work, as well as psychosocial help. The idea behind 
working with educadores and enlaces living and inter-
acting directly with young people on their territory and 
on a sustained basis, is to establish the needed rapport 
with vulnerable youths, and thanks to the profession-
al skills of educadores or the backgrounds of enlaces, 
transform their life patterns.25 According to Cisalva’s 
oicial description, this is a strategy of “social interven-
tion” that enables young people “to have a new horizon 
in life.” In this way, “it is a project to set in motion the 
restitution of rights to these young people, involving 
psychosocial attention and health services, re-inclu-
sion in the formal education system, work options, 
job training, and a selection of cultural and sport pro-
grammes” (Cisalva 2016a, 1).
With this larger objective as a background, what each 
educador and enlace does on a daily basis is to work 
closely with a group of around 10 to 25 young people 
from the area where they are located, overseeing their 
individual and collective development while helping 
them gain access to the education, sport and employ-
ment opportunities ofered by Jóvenes sin Fronteras. 
Educadores and enlaces also try to ensure that the 
young people under their supervision are enrolled in 
the public health system and that their oicial doc-
uments are in order —for example, that they have an 
oicial ID, which in Colombia is required for all kinds of 
transactions, including applying for jobs.
The educational options ofered through Jóvenes sin 
Fronteras are aimed at helping young people inish pri-
mary and secondary school and then access technical 
25 Interview with civil servant 2, 19/04/2017.
training. The sport options are focused on helping 
those with relevant talents get into one of the profes-
sional sports training centers run by the local adminis-
tration. In terms of employment options, on the other 
hand, the programme works a bit diferently. Under 
the direct control of the mayor’s oice, the city created 
1.500 jobs exclusively dedicated to this and other secu-
rity-related programmes. To gain access to one of these 
jobs, young people must complete a basic training; if 
they do so successfully, they can apply for a position.26 
So far the jobs created by the local administration for 
the programme have been primarily manual in nature 
(for example, working in recycling or solid-waste man-
agement projects or eradicating invasive species like 
African snails and cutter ants); or directing crowds and 
regulating queues at the stations of the local public 
transport system (known as MIO). As compensation for 
this work, young people receive a salary of around $250 
USD per month. Crucially for our analysis, this idea of 
ofering actual jobs as part of the Jóvenes sin Fronteras 
programme responds to both an emerging consensus 
within the local administration on the limitations of 
only ofering abstract “instruction” on how to recon-
struct personal and productive lives, and to the mes-
sage that consistently comes from the young people 
targeted by the programme: “what we need is work.”27
Education, sports and work opportunities are not, how-
ever, the sole avenue through which young people are 
steered into new lifestyles. As the above description of 
the programme makes clear, these paths for including 
young people in the city’s oicial dynamics are always 
accompanied by psychosocial support. This takes the 
form of workshops provided by professionals (psychol-
ogists and counsellors) linked to the programme, who 
use, for example, craftwork to help young people work 
through their emotional gaps, in particular in terms 
of lack of positive role models, family support or peer 
support. At the same time, a psychosocial approach 
more generally underpins the actions of all the actors 
administering services to young people, aiming at their 
reconstruction from the inside out.
The Jóvenes sin Fronteras programme’s combination 
of conditional services and a psychosocial approach is 
personiied by Capitán Gómez: the police commander 
in charge of the Local Anti-Gangs Scheme, and thus of 
juvenile violence in the city. Gómez coordinates Jóvenes 
sin Fronteras on the side of the Metropolitan Police 
Department. As coordinator, Gómez is in charge of allo-
cating, through the educadores and enlaces and after dis-
cussions that take place within an inter-departmental 
26 Jóvenes sin Fronteras targets young people from 12 to 28 
years old. When beneiciaries are younger than 16 years old, 
the local administration enables a family member to take up 
the employment options ofered through the programme.
27 Beneiciary of program 1, 30/05/2017.
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security committee that operates under the mayor’s 
oice, the jobs created by the local administration 
for the programme. This facet of Gómez’s role, as the 
administrator of these “conditional” jobs and every-
thing that implies in terms of assigning, not assigning 
or withdrawing these positions depending on young 
people’s behaviour, is closely entangled with his perso-
na and approach to young people and their communi-
ties. In our interviews and ieldwork outings with him 
and police oicers under his command, it was clear how 
this committed, charismatic man with a canny knowl-
edge of the city’s ins and outs radiated both admiration 
and compassion, and how he used this as a platform 
to invite young people to change their life patterns. 
Responding to this, young people from working-class 
neighbourhoods in Cali, admired and trusted Gómez, 
and many called him papá (dad). He is, in this sense, a 
model of community policing: resourceful, close to the 
population, knowledgeable about people’s struggles 
and always ready to create paths for communities to 
live within the boundaries of the law, regardless of the 
adversities that mine their daily existence and territo-
ries. This combination of factors and feelings mark all 
interactions that take place under the Jóvenes sin Fron-
teras programme.
In the context just described, police oicers, educadores, 
enlaces and the young people under their supervision 
reach such a high degree of closeness within the spaces 
opened by Jóvenes sin Fronteras that the interactions 
and conversations between them easily transcend its 
core objectives, reaching many other aspects of their 
lives. For example, everyone knows who is engaged in 
petty crime; who consumes drugs, which ones, when 
and where; what young people are going to do in the 
afternoon or over the weekend; their family history 
(often a history of intense violence); who has not eaten 
that day; who is in love with whom; who has a mental 
health problem; who is pregnant, who has been preg-
nant or has made someone pregnant; who has a death 
sentence over their head; what each young person’s 
dreams are; and, what young people need to say or do in 
order to obtain things: a lunch to share or one of those 
education, sport or work opportunities ofered by the 
local administration.
Within this intimate setting, and through the process 
of combining conditional exchanges with afective 
instruction, the State expands and ends up covering, 
even saturating, the young people’s lives through 
the Jóvenes sin Fronteras programme.28 According to 
the Town Hall and its oicers, this expansion —this 
entrance of the State into the lives of young people— is 
a positive efect of the programme; an efect evidenced 
by the reduction in ofences committed by those linked 
to it. Jóvenes sin Fronteras thus shows, as made clear by 
28 Interview with civil servant, Town Hall, 09/03/2018.
Town Hall oicers, that working with small groups of 
young people and focusing on changing their collective 
dynamics and individual sense of themselves has a clear 
positive impact. According to one of the programme’s 
administrators, this face-to-face approach, accompa-
nied by a strong psychosocial component, enables the 
administration to communicate other ethical patterns 
to young people.29
Jóvenes sin Fronteras speaks strongly then of the syn-
cretism between conditional services and psychosocial 
approaches that we started to analyse in the previous 
sections. The programme operates through a plurality 
of actors delivering services and provisions in exchange 
for young people moving away from criminal activities, 
all accompanied by systematic afective interventions. 
As we have just shown, this latter strategy is reinforced 
by the close proximity to and assumed positive role of 
enlaces, educadores and others involved in the pro-
gramme. All these actors are conceptualised and pres-
ent themselves as role models to young people, and all 
participate in ofering a narrative about the beneits 
of embracing a new future by working through one’s 
emotions and taking advantage of the work, sport and 
education services ofered by the local administration.
Holistic in its intentions and powerful in scope and 
reach, this mixture of conditional services and a psy-
chosocial approach works, however, within a context 
profoundly shaped by inancial constraints. The dif-
ferent actors involved in Jóvenes sin Fronteras come 
together through often very tenuous inter-admin-
istrative labour agreements and, although generous 
in comparison to previous administrations, still with 
very exiguous and short-term budgetary allocations in 
terms of the problems they are meant to solve.
In one of our collective interviews with an enlace, ten of 
the young people under his supervision, and three police 
oicers overseeing his work, for example, the high, 
almost unbelievable, degree of intimacy and cross-sup-
port both within the group and among them, the enlace 
and the police oicers was palpable. Also clear was the 
respect the group had for “their” enlace, their non-con-
frontational, even amicable approach towards the police 
oicers, and the way they rejoiced at the possibility of 
securing a job or taking advantage of the educational 
or sport opportunities they could now access through 
Jóvenes sin Fronteras. All this was a remarkable achieve-
ment given that this enlace and his group were located 
in one of Cali’s most violent neighbourhoods, where all 
of them, including the enlace himself, had grown up. We 
perceived these strong signs of success, however, during 
an interview in the front room of the enlace’s house 
—a humble construction, with bare loor and walls and 
almost no furniture except from some plastic chairs, but 
29 Interview with civil servant 2, 19/04/2017.
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which served as the main venue for the group to meet 
and hang out on a daily basis. The enlace and the group 
were also struggling that day to obtain something for 
lunch, a problem only resolved when the police oicers 
present decided to buy a roast chicken for everyone to 
share, which the enlace would complement by cooking 
some rice that he had secured as a donation, a few weeks 
before, from a non-governmental organisation.
During our conversation with this group it also slowly 
became clear that although they could access some of 
the 1,500 jobs that the local administration has created 
for security programmes, these are all short-term posi-
tions, they are not enough to fulil the existing demand, 
and each opportunity is very limited —as mentioned 
above they consist in manual labour of some kind or in 
helping run the city’s transport system.30 Many young 
people involved in the programme are also unable to 
access these jobs or give them up quickly due to addic-
tions or behavioural problems, and the same is true for 
the education and sport options. Finally, we learnt in 
our conversation with the group that, again, although 
the programme is very ambitious, much better articu-
lated with other local programmes compared to previ-
ous initiatives, and does in fact reach young criminals 
and youth at risk in their own neighbourhoods, what it 
ofers does not necessarily correspond with the com-
plex needs of the young people themselves. For exam-
ple, it does not cover sexual and reproductive health or 
education directly, or mental health services, access to 
the oicial transportation system or, more importantly, 
basic issues like daily meals or housing. This last prob-
lem in particular, the issue of homelessness, was so 
serious that the enlace we were interviewing was him-
self hosting one of the young people under his super-
vision, in order to shield him from further violence on 
the streets or back at his family’s house.
Jóvenes sin Fronteras thus embodies several features 
that characterise the turn towards neo-punitive devel-
opmental practices that have accompanied Security 
and Development discussions. The programme works 
through malleable managerial combinations and legal 
obligations which have the capacity to expand the 
State’s reach and thus its perception as omnipresent. 
This process has been accompanied, however, by shift-
ing the ight against crime from courts and public oic-
es to the very spaces in which “criminals” live, and to 
the “criminals” or “potential criminals” themselves and 
the people who work with them. This subtle but signif-
icant re-arrangement of the security map has brought 
not only the dispersion of the State and its interests and 
logics throughout the social body, but also generated a 
particular kind of saturation of these spaces and peo-
ple’s lives —one in which the essence of the State and 
its laws, as well as the subjective formations that come 
30 Interview with civil servant, Town Hall, 09/03/2018.
from it, are marked by high expectations that are con-
stantly thwarted by the material limits that have come 
to shape the Global South.
The psychosocial dimension that accompanies Jóvenes 
sin Fronteras and similar programmes deepens these 
problems. Jóvenes sin Fronteras aspires to create “good 
people” who know the value of studying in order to one 
day be well-versed citizens, who practise sports in order 
to generate both self-worth and collective pride, and 
who embrace the disciplines of work to secure a stable 
economic life. The seductive power of this vision makes 
Jóvenes sin Fronteras and similar programmes ideal vehi-
cles for promoting the State and its ideas of security in 
violent urban spaces. The problem is that the scope of 
these programmes, in terms of what they actually cover 
is limited. Instead, then, they tend to focus more on dis-
seminating the idea that young people must develop “life 
projects” in order to become successful than they do on 
delivering the services necessary to realize such a prom-
ise (for example, in terms of lasting employment, hous-
ing, or a radical redistribution of power and resources).
The combination of factors just described, then, repro-
duces young subjects who are often increasingly frus-
trated by waiting for their turn to receive the support 
needed to materialise the beneits of living within the 
boundaries of the oicial. The idea of “life projects” is 
very alluring and, as conirmed during our interviews, 
people embrace it keenly. Yet “life projects” generate a 
“projection” of the self that is hard to fulil. They oper-
ate, therefore, as moving targets: the more people com-
mit to them, the more frustrated they get. The result is 
young people who are conversant in the language and 
aspirations ofered through these neo-developmental 
programmes, but who entrench themselves in what 
is already available to them: for example, gangsterish 
styles and deiant manners materialised in (as witnessed 
during our interviews) heavily pierced ears, large items 
of jewellery, bleached eyelashes or vividly dyed hair, 
the latter a sign that they are still “in the war” (en la 
guerra), that is, engaged in gang violence. These fash-
ion choices, this excessive attention to the body and “la 
percha” or clothes, ofer these young people, as they 
do in many other contemporary youth subcultures, a 
degree of control of themselves and a connection with 
peers and the city which oicial narratives and other 
more cognitively deined goals are unable to (Sweetman 
2001). These young people are subjects, therefore, who, 
while “included” within the circuit of oicial discourses, 
remain in a liminal space between the promises of what 
“should” come from this inclusion and the violence that 
continues to mar their lives. They are petty construc-
tions that relect a petty State, with its petty laws, which 
promises but does not deliver. Subjects who remain 
vulnerable. Subjects whose abandonment is now man-
aged through a well-intentioned, but never quite suf-
icient, matrix of services and discourses linked to the 
city’s “security” and “development.”
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The predicament of peripheries: Towards  
a conclusion
The precarity that characterises the young people just 
described is also shared by the educadores and enlaces 
who work for Jóvenes sin Fronteras and who (as men-
tioned above) tend to be hired through very tenuous 
contractual arrangements with the city and its partners. 
These contracts, referred to as prestación de servicios, 
involve a labour relationship that starts and inishes 
within a deined period of time and that does not involve 
any extra charges to the local administration, apart from 
those explicitly stated. But this is not the only aspect of 
their relationship with the city and the State that makes 
their situation precarious. As representatives of the 
city’s administration and the State, and as direct wit-
nesses of the limitations of the programme they help to 
deliver, educadores and enlaces also continually agonise 
alongside the young people under their supervision.
During our observations and interviews, we often saw 
enlaces and educadores, as well as public servants and 
private actors involved in the delivery of other similar 
programmes, break down into tears when describing 
the gap between the needs of young people and what 
the State promises but does not deliver.31 In this act of 
crying, and in their tenuous labour relationships with 
the local administration and the State as a whole, educa-
dores and enlaces further attest to that particular kind 
of pettiness —of marginality and limsiness— that has 
become a key feature of the world unleashed by Secu-
rity and Development in Cali. Their tears and tenuous 
labour contracts, like the hairstyles, jewellery and other 
fashion choices of the young people who work with 
them, also denounce a world where the State, its law 
and subjects cannot be deined by the logics of European 
modernity, governmental rigidity or emotionless ratio-
nality. What we have instead, in this South scenario, is a 
world in which the State, its law and subjects are deined 
by partial forms of abandonment, challenging clothes 
or accessories, and tears running down the faces of 
bureaucrats. Importantly, this “fragility” that we can 
see accompanying the State here is not an anomaly and 
is not external to the State itself, as the World Bank, for 
example, suggests in the 2011 World Development Report 
discussed in the introduction. Instead, this fragility, or 
pettiness as we term it here, is part of the very essence 
of the State in the Global South: a unit that has been 
structurally adjusted in such a way that second-class 
quality has become its essence and operative ethos.
Our reading of Jóvenes sin Fronteras and more generally 
of the discourse of Security and Development contra-
dicts, in this way, traditional Eurocentric theories of the 
formation and functioning of the State. According to 
these theories, States should enjoy a number of features 
31 Field diary, 18/05/2017.
in order to conirm their existence and their presence 
across their territories and populations: they should 
control violence, centralise governmental apparatuses, 
provide services and construct long-lasting human and 
institutional structures (Weber 1976; Tilly 1990). These 
are indeed objectives present in international agendas 
directed to the Global South and embraced by its gov-
ernments: this is so much the case that the UNDP has 
even devised a name for the aspiration of making the 
State constantly and evenly present across territories 
and populations —the search for “State density” (UNDP 
2005; 2009). According to the UNDP, this concept can 
help international and domestic policy makers deine 
whether “States” are present or not across their geog-
raphies and societies, and whether governments are 
doing a good job or not in this regard. The normative 
assumption underpinning this and similar initiatives is 
that the more present the State is, the more legitimate 
it is, the more “security” and “development” it fosters. 
According to the analysis presented here, however, 
even when the State makes itself present in the South, 
even when it expands and saturates the lives of its sub-
jects and territories with the best of intentions, it ends 
up as a thin and low-calibre reality.
Our discussion therefore complicates Weberian assump-
tions about the State, conceived as a solid, rational struc-
ture, organized on the basis of a sharp, all-encompassing, 
fully-functional universal logic. In the context of the 
operation of Security and Development discourse in 
Cali today, however, the State chases vulnerable young 
people and petty criminals in order to include them, but 
once “included” their expectations and needs either go 
unheard or, worse, are found to be impossible to fulil. 
In response, petty criminals and those at risk of falling 
into criminal networks entrench themselves in afec-
tive manoeuvrings linked to consumption and popular 
criminal narratives that are already available to them. 
They cling onto that individuality, which, as their psy-
chosocial counselling has conirmed, is the space they 
have, maybe the only thing they have. Distraught by the 
realities of the young people they work with, precar-
iously employed by public and private institutions, 
and always short of resources to run the programmes 
under their command, the direct representatives of 
the State who accompany these young people weep in 
despair as response to a set of structural realities they 
cannot change or challenge. In all these acts, young 
people, educadores and enlaces embody a State that 
expands and saturates but remains “fragile.”
This reverting back to individual afections and emotions 
is important if we bear in mind the types of service pro-
vided by Security and Development programmes. These 
services always entail an element —often a very substan-
tive element— focused on emotive support and services: 
it is important to listen, understand, love and support 
young people’s visualisation of their “life project” in 
order to overcome insecurity in the city and promote 
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development. In this way the rationality of public action 
becomes geared towards questions of afection, with 
insuicient attention to larger social processes. In this 
turn of events, as Parker has put it, the question of “per-
sonal improvement takes the place of social transforma-
tion, and the psychologisation of social life … encourages 
people to think that the only possible change they could 
ever make would be in the way they dress and present 
themselves to others.” (2007, 2)
The State that comes into being in this context is not, 
for these reasons, a rational entity, interested purely 
in solving problems and attaining goals. It is instead an 
afective sounding board, yet one constrained by mar-
ket logics, and so unable to ensure long-lasting forms 
of political ailiation (Chatterjee 2004). The banali-
sation of the politics involved in this turn of events 
omits the density and cohesion required by social 
transformation, or of the services and provisions that 
used to connect people with the State (Marshall 1992). 
Smallness, marginality and limsiness do not create a 
suitable ground on which to build either the present or 
possible diferent futures. Importantly, as these agonies 
expand to the (South of the) North and global inequality 
hits even harder in (the South of the) South, this mar-
ginality and limsiness are becoming the predicaments 
of peripheries right across the world.
Labour opportunities, as in the Jóvenes sin Fronteras pro-
gramme, are therefore extremely important. They are a 
way to connect people to the “world,” changing their lives 
in a fundamental way. Sadly, however, not only are the jobs 
ofered by Jóvenes sin Fronteras limited and dependent on 
the existence of the programme, but labour as such is dis-
appearing at an astonishing rate (Ferguson 2015). On the 
other hand, afective attention is both inancially savvy 
and it plays an important function in ensuring that young 
people value themselves. It also helps those working with 
them, for example educadores and enlaces, to establish 
the rapport needed to get in contact with them. However, 
in some ways it also depoliticizes everyone involved. The 
young people we engaged with in Cali, in particular those 
still waiting for one of the Jóvenes sin Fronteras job oppor-
tunities, spend their days waiting for the State to bring 
the efective entitlements they need. They hang around 
on neighbourhood corners passing time, disconnected 
in sport facilities, bored in training sessions, perhaps 
still engaged or thinking to engage in crime. The “petty 
criminal” and young people at risk who are involved in 
Security and Development programmes can be seen, in 
this sense, as post-citizens of a certain kind: individuals 
who should be cared for but whose needs cannot be fully 
taken into account (Lefranc 2017, 140-144). Meanwhile, 
educadores and enlaces agonise about the situation of the 
young people under their supervision, and the city resi-
dents continue to panic given Cali’s ongoing insecurity. All 
of this occurs, of course, as life becomes yet more inten-
sively securitized by the signiicant amount of resources 
that continue to be spent by companies, residents and the 
local administration on new surveillance technologies 
and police salaries and infrastructure. In this complex 
interaction between petty subjects, the petty State and 
its petty laws, vulnerability is managed in such a way that 
abandonment becomes sustainable.
References
1. Akhtar, Zia. 2015. “Young Ofenders, ‘Secure Colleges’ 
and Reforming Criminals.” Journal of Criminal Law 79 (3): 
211-228. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022018315586168
2. Alta Consejería Presidencial para la Convivencia y 
Seguridad Ciudadana. 2011. “Política Nacional de Segu-
ridad Ciudadana y Convivencia.” Bogotá: Presidencia de 
Colombia. https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Prensa/
Publicaciones/1-PNSCC%20FINAL%20AGO%202011.pdf
3. Alviar, Helena. 2013. “Social Policy and the New Devel-
opmental State: The Case of Colombia.” In Law and the 
New Developmental State: The Brazilian Experience in 
Latin American Context, edited by David Trubek, Hele-
na Alviar, Diego Coutinho and Álvaro Santos, 345-368. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
4. Armitage, Maurice. 2016. “Plan de Gobierno (Creemos 
Cali) (2016-2019).” Cali.
5. Beck, Ulrich. 1992. The Risk Society. London: SAGE.
6. Cali cómo vamos. 2015. “Informe de Calidad de vida 
2015” (Life Quality in Cali Report). Cali. https://www.
calicomovamos.org.co/2015-icv
7. Cámara de Comercio de Cali (CCC). 2017. “Informes 
económicos” (Financial reports). Cali. http://www.ccc.
org.co/ile/2017/03/AE-N89-Mas-empresas-menos-
pobres.pdf
8. Chandler, David. 2007. “The Security–Development 
Nexus and the Rise of ‘Anti-Foreign Policy’.” Journal 
of International Relations and Development 10 (4): 362-
386. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800135
9. Chandler, David. 2015. “Rethinking the Conlict-Pov-
erty Nexus: From Securitising Intervention to Resil-
ience.” Stability: International Journal of Security & 
Development 4 (1): 1-14. https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.b
10. Chatterjee, Partha. 2004. The Politics of the Governed. 
Relections on Popular Politics in Most of the World. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
11. Chioda, Laura. 2017. Stop the Violence in Latin America: 
A Look at Prevention from Cradle to Adulthood. Wash-
ington: World Bank.
12. Cisalva. 2016a. “Atención integral a jóvenes vulnerables 
de Cali.” Instituto Cisalva Noticias. https://drive.google.
com/ile/d/0B02w4dYyMJ9lc0hraDgxS0w4RHc/view
13. Cisalva. 2016b. Jóvenes sin Fronteras. Brochure. [On ile 
with the authors].
14. Cisalva. 2017. “Proyecto ‘Atención integral a miembros 
de treinta y cuatro pandillas y miembros de su entor-
no familiar, en ocho comunas de la ciudad de Cali’.” TIP 
Jóvenes sin Fronteras. Resumen Ejecutivo. Cali: Cisalva. 
https://drive.google.com/ile/d/0B3KS90TWnk1mU0t-
JSVVLdjJ1VzA/view
15. Comarof, Jean and John Comarof. 2016. The Truth about 
Crime: Sovereignty, Knowledge and Social Order. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
54
rev.estud.soc. No. 67 • enero-marzo • Pp. 40-55 • ISSN 0123-885X • e-ISSN 1900-5180 · https://doi.org/10.7440/res67.2019.04
D O S S I E R
16. Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justi-
cia Penal (CCSP JP). 2017. “Las 50 ciudades más violentas 
del mundo 2016.” http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.
org.mx/biblioteca/download/6-prensa/239-las-50-ciu-
dades-mas-violentas-del-mundo-2016-metodologia
17. Corporación Excelencia por la Juticia (CEJ) and British 
Embassy. 2011. “Balance de los primeros cinco años 
de funcionamiento del Sistema Penal Acusatorio en 




18. Cough, Katherine and Mónica Franch. 2006. “Spaces 
of the Street: Socio-Spatial Mobility and Exclusion of 
Youth in Recife.” Children’s Geographies 3 (2): 149-166.
19. Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). 2011. 
“Política Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana y Convi-
vencia.” Colombia: DNP – Dirección de Justicia, Segu-
ridad y Gobierno.
20. Duield, Mark. 2014. Global Governance and the New 
Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (Cri-
tique Inluence Change). London: Zed Books.
21. Eslava, Luis. 2015. Local Space, Global Life. The Every-
day Operation of International Law and Development. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
22. Eslava, Luis. 2019. “The Developmental State: Indepen-
dence, Dependency and the History of the South.” In 
The Battle for International Law in the Decolonization 
Era, edited by Jochen von Bernstorf and Philipp Dann. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23. Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1999. Social Foundations of 
Postindustrial Economies. Oxford – New York: Oxford 
University Press.
24. Ferguson, James. 2015. Give a Man a Fish: Relections on the 
New Politics of Distribution. Duke: Duke University Press.
25. Fischer, Andrew. 2015. “The End of Peripheries? 
On the Enduring Relevance of Structuralism for 
Understanding Contemporary Global Development.” 
Development and Change 46 (4): 700-732. https://doi.
org/10.1111/dech.12180
26. Focas, Brenda and Omar Rincón. 2016. Seguridad, medios 
y miedo: Una mirada desde las experiencias y las prácticas 
cotidianas de Latin America. Cali: Icesi – El Sur el Cielo Roto.
27. Frosh, Stephen. 2003. “Psychosocial Studies and 
Psychology: Is a Critical Approach Emerging?” 
Human Relations 56 (12): 1545-1567. https://doi.
org/10.1177/00187267035612005
28. Goldstein, Daniel. 2010. “Toward a Critical Anthropol-
ogy of Security.” Current Anthropology 51 (4): 487-517. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/655393
29. Goldstein, Daniel. 2011. “Human Rights as Culprit, Human 
Rights as Victim: Rights and Security in the State of 
Exception.” In The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking 
Law between the Global and the Local, edited by Mark 
Goodale and Sally Engle Merry, 49-77. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
30. Gunter Franck, Andre. 1966. The Development of 
Underdevelopment. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
31. Haapasalo, Jana. 2000. “Young Ofenders’ Experienc-
es of Child Protection Services.” Journal of Youth and 
Adolescence: A Multidisciplinary Research Publication 
29 (3): 355-371.
32. Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF). 
2012. “Boletin especial No. 1. Adolecentes en conlicto 
con la ley penal. Sistema de responsabilidad penal para 
adolescentes.” Bogotá: ICBF – Observatorio de biene-
star de la niñez.
33. Jessop, Bob. 2016. The State: Past, Present, Future. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
34. Johnson, Walter. 2015. “Ferguson’s Fortune 500 
Company.” The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2015/04/fergusons-fortune-
500-company/390492/
35. Kennedy, David. 2006. “The ‘Rule of Law,’ Politi-
cal Choices, and Development Common Sense.” In 
The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical 
Appraisal, edited by David Trubek and Álvaro Santos, 
95-173. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
36. Klein, Elise. 2017. “The World Bank on Mind, Behaviour 
and Society.” Development and Change 48 (3): 481-501. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12308
37. Lefranc, Sandrine. 2017. “La venganza de las víctimas.” 
Revista de Estudios Sociales 59: 140-144. https://doi.
org/10.7440/res59.2017.12
38. Li, Tania Murray. 2013. “Jobless Growth and Relative 
Surplus Populations.” Anthropology Today 29 (3): 1-2. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8322.12026
39. Madsen, Ole Jacob. 2014. The Therapeutic Turn: How Psy-
chology Altered Western Culture. New York: Routledge.
40. Marshall, Thomas. 1992. Citizenship and Social Class. 
London: Pluto Press.
41. Medan, Marina. 2012. “¿‘Proyecto de vida’? tensiones 
en un programa de prevención del delito juvenil.” 
Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Niñez y 
Juventud 10 (1): 79-91.
42. Medan, Marina. 2014. “Distintos Mensajes Estatales 
en la Regulación de la ‘Juventud en Riesgo’.” Astrolabio 
13: 313-343.
43. Moser, Caroline and Bernice van Bronkhorst. 1999. 
“Youth Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Costs, Causes, and Interventions.” Urban Peace Pro-
gramme Series. Latin America and Caribbean Region Sus-
tainable Development Working Paper No. 3. World Bank.
44. Narcos (Netlix, Season 1: 2015, Season 2, 2016). Pro-
ducers, Chris Brancato, Carlo Bernard and Doug Miro.
45. Neocleous, Mark. 2014. War Power, Police Power. Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press.
46. Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA), 
Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. 
2009. “Informe sobre Seguridad Ciudadana y Derechos 
Humanos.” http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Seguri-
dad/seguridadindice.sp.htm
47. Parker, Ian. 2007. Revolution in Psychology: Alienation 
to Emancipation. London: Pluto Press.
48. Policía Metropolitana de Cali. 2016. “Programa de 
Tratamiento Integral de Pandillas (TIPS).” Cali: Unidad 
de Policia Preventiva, Policía Metropolitana de Cali.
55
Security and Development? A Story about Petty Crime, the Petty State and its Petty Law | Luis Eslava · Lina Buchely
D O S S I E R
49. Pontes Nogueira, Joao. 2017. “From Failed States to 
Fragile Cities: Redeining Spaces of Humanitarian 
Practice.” Third World Quarterly 38 (7): 1437-1453. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1282814
50. Pottage, Alain and Martha Mundy (eds.). 2004. Law, 
Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social: Mak-
ing Persons and Things. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
51. Povinelli, Elizabeth. 2011. Economies of Abandonment: 
Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
52. Raggio, Liliana and Horacio Sabarots. 2012. “Políti-
cas públicas en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires dirigidas a 
juventudes vulnerables: Continuidades y transforma-
ciones en la última década.” Runa 33 (1): 9-31.
53. Rodney, Walter. 1972. How Europe Underdeveloped 
Africa. London: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications.
54. Rodríguez, Cesar, Tatiana Alfonso Sierra and Isabel 
Cavaelier Adarve. 2009. “Raza y derechos humanos 
en Colombia. Informe sobre discriminación racial y 
derechos de la población afrocolombiana.” Bogotá: 
Universidad de los Andes – Escuela de Derecho – Cijus.
55. Rose, Nikolas. 1989. Governing the Soul. London: 
Routledge.
56. Santillán, Alfredo and Soledad Varea. 2014. “Estrate-
gias y políticas de inclusión (¿asimilación?) de pandil-
las en Ecuador: dos modelos de ciudades, dos visiones 
sobre las potencialidades de los/as jóvenes pandille-
ros/as (Investigación).” URVIO-Revista Latinoameri-
cana de Estudios de Seguridad (4): 80-102. https://doi.
org/10.17141/urvio.4.2008.1085
57. Sharma, Aradhana and Gupta, Akhil. 2006. The Anthro-
pology of the State: A Reader. Malden: Blackwell Pub.
58. Siennick, Sonja. 2011. “Tough Love? Crime and 
Parental Assistance in Young Adulthood.” Crimi-
nology 49 (1): 163-195. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-
9125.2010.00221.x
59. Stenner, Paul and Taylor, David. 2008. “Psychoso-
cial Welfare: Relections on an Emerging Field.” 
Critical Social Policy 28 (4): 415-437. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0261018308095278
60. Sweetman, Paul. 2001. “Stop Making Sense?: The Prob-
lem of the Body in Youth/Sub/Counter-Culture.” In 
Exploring the Body, edited by Sara Cunningham-Burley 
and Kathryn Backett-Milburn, 183-200. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
61. “The World’s Most Dangerous Cities.” 2017. The 
Economist, March 31st, https://www.economist.com/
blogs/graphicdetail/2017/03/daily-chart-23
62. Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European 
States, AD 990-1992. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell.
63. Trubek, David. 2006. “The ‘Rule of Law’ in Devel-
opment Assistance: Past, Present, and Future.” In 
The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical 
Appraisal, edited by David Trubek and Álvaro Santos, 
74-94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
64. Trubek, David. 2013. “Law, State, and the New Devel-
opmentalism. An Introduction.” En Law and the New 
Developmental State: The Brazilian Experience in Latin 
American Context, edited by David Trubek, Helena 
Alviar, Diego Coutinho and Álvaro Santos, 3-27. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
65. Tufró, Manuel. 2010. “El cronotopo barrial Vida cotid-
iana, argumentación y verdad en los discursos de una 
agrupación vecinal para la prevención del delito.” Sig-
no y Pensamiento 29 (57): 330-341.
66. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2005. 
“Measuring Country Performance and State Behavior: A 




67. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2009. 
“Informe sobre desarrollo humano, Perú 2009: Por una 
densidad del Estado al servicio de la gente.” UNDP. http://
hdr.undp.org/sites/default/iles/idh2009-peru-vol1-2.pdf
68. United Nations. 2015. “Sustainable Development Goals.” 
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustain-
able-development-goals/
69. Uribe-Castro, Hernando, Carmen Holguín and Germán 
Ayala. 2016. “De ‘invasores’ a población urbanizada: 
encerramiento simbólico de los habitantes de Potrero 
Grande en Cali-Colombia.” Prospectiva (21): 181-211. 
https://doi.org/10.25100/prts.v0i21.925
70. Urna de Cristal - Gobierno Visible. 2013. “¿Cuánto 




71. Urrea, Fernando. 1997. “Dinámica sociodemográica, 
mercado laboral y pobreza urbana en Cali durante las 
décadas de los años 80 y 90.” Revista Coyuntura Social 
17: 105-164.
72. Ursin, Marit. 2012. “The City is ours: The Temporal 
Construction of Dominance among Poor Young Men 
on the Street in a Brazilian Elite Neighbourhood.” 
Journal of Latin American Studies 44 (3): 467-493. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X12000405
73. Weber, Max. 1976. Economy and Society. California: 
University of California Press.
74. Winton, Alisa. 2005. “Youth, Gangs and Violence: Ana-
lyzing the Social and Spatial Mobility of Young People 
in Guatemala City.” Children’s Geographies 3 (2): 167-
184. https://doi.org/10.1080/14733280500161537
75. World Bank. 2005. “Case Study: Reduction of Crime 
in Bogotá: A Decade of Citizen’s Security Policies.” 
Bogotá: World Bank.
76. World Bank. 2011. “Violence in the City. Understand-
ing and Supporting Community Response to Urban 
Violence.” Washington: Social Development Depart-
ment; Conlict, Crime and Violence Team. https://
www.unicef.org/protection/Violence_in_the_City.pdf
77. World Bank. 2013. “Citizen Insecurity in Latin America: 
Exchanging Experiences in Search of Solutions.” http://
www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/06/26/
inseguridad-america-latina-conferencia-cali
78. World Bank. 2014. How Firms Cope with Crime and Vio-
lence. Washington: World Bank.
79. Zoellick, Robert. 2011. World Development Report: Con-
lict, Security and Development. Washington: World Bank.
